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1. Motivation 
In late 2008 world trade experienced a sudden, severe and synchronized collapse 
that was the sharpest in recorded history and the deepest since World War II – this is 
now known as The Great Trade Collapse (Baldwin 2009, p. 1).
1 German exports are 
a case in point. 2009 was the year with the sharpest decline in foreign trade in the 
history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The value of total exports declined by 18 
percent compared to 2008, and Germany lost the title of the World Export Champion 
to China.
2 
A number of studies (including Anderton and Tewolde (2011), Asmundson et. 
al. (2011), di Mauro et al. (2010), Eaton et al. (2011), OECD (2010) and Stehrer et. 
al. (2011), ch. 5) analyze this trade crisis from a macroeconomic point of view. 
Studies that take a microeconomic perspective and that try to understand what was 
going on under the veil of the macroeconomic developments by looking at firm level 
data
3, however, are scarce. Behrens et al. (2011) match firm-level data for firm-
country-product exports with balance sheet data for Belgium and decompose the 
trade collapse along the extensive and the intensive margins, where the extensive 
margin is defined as changes in exports due to firms that stop or start to export and 
the intensive margin refers to (negative or positive) changes in exports by firms that 
continue to export. They find that firm exit and the dropping of products and markets 
played only a small role during the trade collapse – changes in trade volumes were 
essentially driven by reduced quantities and unit prices. The intensive margin was 
much more important than the extensive margin. Similarly, based on analyses of firm-
                                                           
1 See Baldwin (2009) for facts and figures on this, a discussion of its causes and the relation to the 
global economic slump that is now called The Great Recession. 
2 See Meyer (2010) for a detailed account of German foreign trade in 2009. 
3 See Haddad et al. (2011) for a study using product level (and not firm level) data from Brazil, the EU, 
Indonesia and the United States.   3
level data for France Fontagné and Gaulier (2009) report that the number of 
exporters has been only slightly reduced by the crisis, while the bulk of the observed 
decline in exports happened at the intensive margin and, more precisely, was due to 
the drop in the value exported by the top 1% of exporters (see also Bricongne et al. 
2010, 2011). 
 Only one study based on firm-level data touches upon the case of Germany. 
The second policy report of the project EFIGE – European Firms in a Global 
Economy (Barba Navaretti et al. 2011) is based on firm level data collected in 
surveys in Austria and Hungary (covering about 500 firms in each country), Germany 
and the UK (for about 2,000 firms), and France, Italy and Spain (for about 3,000 
firms). While the questionnaire is mainly focused on 2008, some information is 
collected on 2009 and changes between the two years. Slightly more than half of the 
7,536 exporters in the sample reduced the value of their exports in 2009 compared to 
2008, 29.8 percent reported unchanged exports and 18.7 percent increased them. 
Firms that stopped exports were rare, covering only 3.8 percent of the firms in the 
sample. These findings fit into the big picture reported in the country studies for 
Belgium and France summarized above, pointing out that the intensive margin was 
much more important than the extensive margin during the great export collapse.
4 
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first results for the 
microstructure of the great export collapse based on comprehensive high quality data 
for all firms (with a minimum workforce of twenty persons) from manufacturing 
industries in Germany, a leading actor on the world market for goods. To anticipate 
the most important results this study demonstrates that a very large share of the 
                                                           
4 For an in depth analysis of the sample of German firms from the EFIGE project see the country study 
by Neugebauer and Spies (2011). Note, however, that the sample is far too small for any detailed 
analysis, and the answers regarding the change in exports seem to be, according to the authors, not 
reliable in many cases (see Neugebauer and Spies (2011), p. 4).   4
decline in exports from manufacturing firms in Germany in 2009 was due to negative 
changes of exports in enterprises that continued to export (i.e. at the so-called 
intensive margin) while the decrease of exports due to export stoppers (at the so-
called extensive margin) was tiny. In West Germany where exports declined by 21 
percent a small fraction made of five percent of all exporting firms from the size class 
with 500 or more employees was responsible for around 73 percent of the gross 
decrease in exports. Idiosyncratic movements of the top 10 firms in an industry can 
explain a large fraction (more than one third) of export fluctuations here. In East 
Germany where exports declined only moderately by 3.77 percent a large fraction of 
the gross decline of exports was compensated by an increase in exports in a small 
group of large firms that made up 0.5% of all firms engaged in exports.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
enterprise level data used in this study. Section 3 presents the empirical approach 
applied to decompose the overall change of exports into components that enables a 
look behind the veil of macroeconomic aggregates and discusses the results of the 
decomposition of export dynamics. Section 4 investigates the role of idiosyncratic 
shocks to the largest firms for the overall change in exports. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this study are based on the monthly report for establishments in 
manufacturing industries, a survey conducted regularly by the German statistical 
offices that is described in detail in Konold (2007). This survey covers all 
establishments from manufacturing industries that employ at least twenty persons in 
the local production unit or in the company that owns the unit. Participation of firms in 
the survey is mandated in official statistics law. For this study the information   5
collected at the establishment level has been aggregated at the enterprise level (see 
Malchin and Voshage (2009) for details).   
The unbalanced panel data set includes all firms that were active in at least 
one year over the period 2008 and 2009. The nominal export values reported in the 
survey were deflated using the index of export prices (2005 = 100) reported by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank.
5 
In this data set, export refers to the amount of sales to a customer in a foreign 
country plus sales to a German export trading company; indirect exports (for 
example, tires produced in a plant in Germany that are delivered to a German 
manufacturer of cars who exports some of his products) are not covered by this 
definition.  
 
3.  Decomposition of export dynamics 
3.1 Method  of  analysis 
With the panel data set described in section 2 firms can be followed over time. The 
basic idea on how to look behind the veil of aggregate figures of export dynamics 
familiar from publications of official statistics is to apply a technique widely used in 
the analysis of job turnover
6 in a slightly modified way. When firms are compared 
between the two years 2008 and 2009 there are some which did not export in both 
years. These firms are ignored in the analysis. Each of the other firms belongs to one 
of five types: 
(1)  Export starters (firms that did not report exports in 2008 but in 2009). 
                                                           
5 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht, Januar 2011, p. 66*. 
6 A comprehensive description of this method of analysis for job creation and destruction can be found 
in OECD (1987). This decomposition of changes in total exports leads to the distinction of five different 
types of firms that is both intuitively clear and economically meaningful. If we were interested in   6
(2)  Enterprises with increased exports between 2008 and 2009. 
(3)  Enterprises with constant exports in both years. 
(4)  Enterprises with decreased exports between 2008 and 2008. 
(5)  Export stoppers (firms that did report exports in 2008 but not in 2009).
7 
The net change in total exports between the two years is the sum of the 
positive gross changes by the first two types and the negative gross changes by the 
last two types of firms. The percentage rate of change in total exports can be 
decomposed accordingly to show the relative contribution of each of these types of 
firms to total export dynamics.
8 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
changes in the share of exports in total sales over time instead we would have used a decomposition 
method familiar from studies on aggregate productivity growth; see Haltiwanger (1997). 
7 Due to the construction of the panel data set some remarks on the interpretation of export starters 
and export stoppers are necessary: The group of export starters includes plants which exported in 
earlier years but which did not have to report to the survey because they were too small (for example, 
a firm with 18 employees in 2007 and 21 in 2008), did not belong to the manufacturing sector (for 
example, an establishment that earned more than half of its revenues from farm sector activities in 
2007 but more than half from manufacturing activities in 2008), or relocated to Germany from a foreign 
country) between 2007 and 2008. Similarly, the group of export stoppers includes plants which 
continued to export in later years but which did not have to report to the survey any longer because 
they became too small, did not belong to the manufacturing sector any more, or relocated out of 
Germany. This fuzzyness in the classification of firms as export starters and stoppers could be 
reduced only by checking the files kept in the statistical office by hand - which is not possible due to 
time constraints (binding for the people from official statistics) and data protection laws (binding for 
me). 
8 The same method was used in an analysis of export dynamics from 1995 to 2002 for establishments 
from one German federal state, Lower Saxony, in Wagner (2004). For similar work see Bernard and 
Jensen (2004) using data from the United States in 1987 and 1992, Gleeson and Ruane (2007) using 
data for Ireland from 1985 to 2003, Eaton et al (2007) using data for Columbia from 1996 to 2005, 
Lawless (2009) using data for Ireland from 2001 to 2004, Bernard et al. (2009) using data for the 
United States from 1993 to 2003, Chen and Yu (2010) using data for Canada from 1999 to 2006, and 
De Lucio et al. (2011) using data for Spain from 1997 to 2007. None of these studies, however, 
investigates the great export crisis of 2009. For studies decomposing the export collapse of 2008/2009 
see Behrens et al. (2011) for Belgium and the papers using data for France by Bricongne et al. (2010, 
2011) and Fontagné and Gaulier (2009) that are discussed in the introductory section.   7
This decomposition analysis can be performed for all enterprises from 
manufacturing industries and for various subgroups of firms. In this paper results are 
reported for enterprises from six size classes (measured by the number of 
employees: 1-19, 20 - 49, 50 - 99, 100 - 249, 250 - 499, and 500 and more)
9. 
 
3.2 Results   
Results for West Germany
10 are reported in Table 1. From the first row it can be seen 
that exports from manufacturing enterprises fell dramatically by 21.27 percent from 
2008 to 2009 during The Great Export Collapse. Most of this decline is due to 
negative changes of exports in enterprises that continue to export (i.e. at the so-
called intensive margin) while the decrease of exports due to export stoppers (at the 
so-called extensive margin) is tiny. These findings are in accordance with results 
reported for Belgium and France (discussed in the introductory section). Surprisingly 
(at least for readers not familiar with the job creation and destruction literature, or with 
earlier studies on export dynamics based on firm level panel data) even in this period 
of an extreme export decline there were thousands of enterprises with increased 
exports - some 26 percent of all firms fall into this group (see second row of Table 1). 
                                                           
9 Enterprises are classified into a size class according to the average number of employees in the two 
years under consideration. If the number of persons was missing in the data set in one year (for 
reasons, see footnote 7), the figure from the other year was used. The number of employees in the 
base (first) year was not used to compute the size class because of the role of transitory employment 
shocks and the related regression-to-the-mean fallacy. For a discussion of this problem in the context 
of job creation and destruction in the US see Davis et al. (1996); Wagner (1995) shows that this is 
relevant for German firm level panel data, too. 
10 The economy differs between West Germany and the former communist East Germany even some 
20 years after the unification in 1990, and this holds especially for exports (see Wagner (2008) for a 
detailed analysis). Therefore, all results were computed fro West Germany and East Germany 
separately.    8
The increase of exports due to these firms, however, is small compared to the 
decrease in exports due to firms with fallen exports.
11 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Results for enterprises from the five size classes that are reported in the lower 
panel of Table 1 show a rather similar broad picture with regard to the role of the 
extensive and intensive margins of exports and regarding the share of firms with 
decreased or increased exports. Note that the share of firms with increased exports 
declines with an increase in the firm size class, while the opposite holds for the share 
of firms with decreased exports. 
The small group of firms with 500 or more employees are of a dominant 
importance for the total decline in exports. The share of these firms in all exports was 
74 percent in 2008 and 73 percent in 2009. From the figures reported in row one of 
Table 1 it can be seen that the net reduction of exports by 122 Mrd. Euro is the result 
of a gross increase of exports by 18 Mrd. Euro and a gross decrease by 140 Mrd. 
Euro. From this total gross decrease in exports according to the last but one row of 
Table 1 103 Mrd. Euro are due to firms with decreased exports from the largest size 
class. This means that 1,017 firms from the total of 19,968 firms – or five percent of 
all exporting firms – are responsible for around 73 percent of the gross decrease in 
exports.  
Results for East Germany are reported in Table 2. These results differ 
considerably from the results reported for West Germany. East German 
manufacturing exports declined by 3.77 percent only (see the first row of Table 2), 
                                                           
11 Note that there are no firms with constant exports. This is due to the use of a deflator when 
transforming the nominal export values reported by the enterprises into the real export values   9
and this decline was small compared to the dramatic decline of 21.27 percent in West 
Germany – in the East German manufacturing sector there was no such thing as a 
great export collapse in 2009. As in West Germany (and in Belgium and France), 
changes at the extensive margin due to export starters and export stoppers 
contributed only marginally to the overall development of exports. The rate of change 
of exports was driven by developments at the intensive margin, where the 12.63 
percentage decrease of exports due to firms with decreased exports was 
compensated to 70 percent by an increase of exports due to firms with increased 
exports of 8.85 percent.  
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Results for enterprises from the five size classes that are reported in the lower 
panel of Table 2 show that the moderate decline in manufacturing exports from East 
German enterprises is driven by the firms from the largest size class. In 2008, 75.6% 
of all exports originated in firms from this size class; the corresponding figure for 
2009 is 78.4%. The decrease of exports by firms with decreased exports from the 
size class of firms with 500 or more employees is nearly compensated by the 
increase of exports due to firms with increased exports from this size class – the net 
change of exports is tiny (-0.17%). While the 71 firms from the largest size class with 
decreased exports were responsible for 55% of the overall gross decline of exports, 
the 19 large firms with increased exports were responsible for 77% of the overall 
gross increase in exports. It would be very interesting to find out more about these 19 
firms (that were only 0.5 % of all firms a c t i v e  i n  e x p o r t i n g  i n  E a s t  G e r m a n  
manufacturing) that managed to increase their exports considerably during a period 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(measured in constant 2005 prices) used in the calculations here.   10
of world-wide export decline. What are their firm specific advantages that make them 
so successful? In which countries do they sell their exports, which role did exchange 
rate changes and business cycle conditions in these countries play? Unfortunately, 
however, due to strict confidentiality of the micro data from official statistics used in 
this study it is not possible to dig deeper here. 
While the big picture on the export dynamics in the manufacturing sector 
during the great crisis of 2009 differs considerably between West Germany and East 
Germany – demonstrating again that a separate analysis for both parts of Germany is 
necessary even some 20 years after the unification of both parts of Germany – the 
look behind the veil of macroeconomic aggregates by using firm level data to 
decompose the overall change in exports into its components reveals one striking 
similarity: A small fraction of firms from the largest size class is responsible for 
shaping the big picture. To put these findings into perspective, Table 3 documents 
evidence on the concentration of exports and domestic sales in enterprises from 
German manufacturing industries in 2008 and 2009. The shares of the 3, 10, 50 and 
100 largest exporters (by value of export sales) and largest firms in domestic sales 
(by value of domestic sales) are reported separately for West Germany and East 
Germany. 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
In both parts of Germany a small number of very large firms are responsible 
for a large share of both exports and domestic sales. This concentration is higher in 
exports than in domestic sales, and it is higher in East Germany than in West 
Germany. This illustrates that a small fraction of large enterprises is responsible to a   11
high degree for the macroeconomic development, a point that is elaborated on in the 
next section. 
 
4.  The granular nature of manufacturing exports in Germany 
Standard macroeconomic reasoning usually discards the possibility that idiosyncratic 
microeconomic shocks to firms may lead to large aggregate fluctuations by referring 
to a diversification argument.
12 A classical case in point is the argument put forward 
by Robert Lucas (1977) that such microeconomic shocks would average out and, 
therefore, would only have negligible aggregate effects. In a recent Econometrica 
paper Xavier Gabaix (2011) proposes that, contrary to this traditional view, 
idiosyncratic firm-level shocks can indeed explain an important part of aggregate 
economic movements and provide a micro-foundation for aggregate shocks. He 
shows that the “averaging out” argument breaks down if the size distribution of firms 
is fat-tailed and very large firms play an important role in an economy. This is the 
case in the United States, where, according to the findings of Gabaix (2011), the 
idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 firms appear to explain about one-third of 
variations in output growth. Wagner (2011) reports similar evidence for the 
manufacturing sector in Germany and finds that idiosyncratic shocks in the largest 
firms are important for an understanding of aggregate volatility in German 
manufacturing industries. 
Gabaix (2011) argues that many economic fluctuations are attributable to the 
incompressible “grains” of economic activity, the large firms. Therefore, he names 
this view the “granular” hypothesis. The granular view does not neglect the role of 
aggregate shocks like changes in monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policy as 
                                                           
12 This section builds on the investigation of the granular nature of the German manufacturing sector in 
Wagner (2011).   12
important drivers of macroeconomic activity. It only argues that such aggregate 
shocks are not the only important drivers, and that firm specific idiosyncratic shocks, 
too, are an important, and possibly the major, part of the origin of business-cycle 
fluctuations (Gabaix 2011, p. 764). 
As said the “averaging out” argument of standard macroeconomic reasoning 
breaks down if the size distribution of firms is fat-tailed and very large firms play an 
important role in an economy. From the percentage shares of the largest enterprises 
in total exports in manufacturing industries West Germany
13 in 2008 and 2009 that 
are documented in Table 3 it is evident that the exports of manufacturing enterprises 
are highly concentrated. The very large firms, therefore, represent a large part of the 
export activity in the manufacturing sector.  
In Table 4 the estimated power law exponents for exports are reported for all 
firms and for firms from 18 manufacturing industries.
14 A power law is a relation of the 
type Y = k*X
ß, where Y and X are variables of interest, ß is the power law exponent, 
and k is a constant.
15 A popular way to estimate the power law exponent ß for the 
firm size distribution (where firm size is measured by exports here) is to compute the 
rank of each firm in the size distribution and to run an OLS regression of log(rank) on 
a constant and log(size). The estimated regression coefficient of log(size) is an 
estimate for ß. Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) show that this procedure leads to 
strongly biased estimates in small samples. They provide a simple practical remedy 
for this bias by suggesting to use rank – ½ instead of rank and then run 
                                                           
13 This section looks at West Germany only. A separate analysis of the exports from the  East German 
manufacturing sector is not possible because the number of firms in many industries is far too small. 
14 The industries are at the 2-digit level with four exceptions where two 2-digit industries are matched 
because the number of firms is too small in one industry. For a definition of industries and the number 
of firms see the appendix table.  
15 Gabaix (2009) is a comprehensive survey of power laws and applications in economics and finance. 
   13
log(rank – ½) = k - ß*log(size). They show that the shift of ½ is optimal and reduces 
the bias to a leading order. Note that the standard error of ß is not the OLS standard 
error reported by the computer program, but is asymptotically given by (2/n) 
½ *|b| 
(where n is the number of firms used in the estimation).  
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
The estimated power-law coefficient is statistically significantly different from 
zero at an error level of less than 1 percent in German manufacturing as a whole and 
in every industry. According to the R
2-value the fit is rather tight. These results 
indicate that exports are power-law distributed in all industries. Descriptive results, 
therefore, indicate that the distribution of exports from the German manufacturing 
sector as a whole and from the various industries that are part of it can be 
characterised as fat-tailed.  
To test for the granular nature of exports from German manufacturing 
industries the data for enterprises from 18 manufacturing industries that are 
described above are used and the role of the 10 largest firms in each industry is 
considered. The empirical approach closely follows Gabaix (2011, p. 750ff.). The 
idiosyncratic firm-level sales shock is measured by the “granular residual” that is 
computed as follows. git is the growth rate of exports for firm i and year t, computed 
as log(exportsit) – log(exportsit-1). g10t is the average of the growth rates of the 10 
largest firms (according to exports in year t-1) in an industry. The granular residual is 
a weighted sum of the 10 largest firm’s growth rate minus g10t, where the weights 
are the shares of the firms in total exports of all firms in an industry in year t-1. Here, t 
refers to 2009 and t-1 refers to 2008.   14
The growth rate of total exports in an industry, defined as log(total exports in 
2009) minus log(total exports in 2008), is regressed on the granular residual from the 
industry using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Results are reported in the first column 
of Table 5. They are supportive of the granular hypothesis. The estimated coefficient 
for the granular residual is highly statistically significant. If only aggregate shocks 
were important for the growth rate of total exports in an industry, then the R
2 of the 
regressions in Table 5 would be zero. It is not. Idiosyncratic movements of the top 10 
firms in an industry can explain a large fraction (more than one third) of export 
fluctuations.  
It is well known that results estimated by OLS can be highly sensitive to a 
small fraction of observations that lay far away from the majority of observations in 
the sample. As a robustness check, therefore, we investigate whether the results 
reported depend on extreme observations, or outliers. Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) 
distinguish three types of outliers that influence the OLS estimator: vertical outliers, 
bad leverage points, and good leverage points. Verardi and Croux (2009, p. 440) 
illustrate this terminology in a simple linear regression framework that is used here 
(the generalization to higher dimensions is straightforward) as follows: “Vertical 
outliers are those observations that have outlying values for the corresponding error 
term (the y dimension) but are not outlying in the space of explanatory variables (the 
x dimension). Their presence affects the OLS estimation and, in particular, the 
estimated intercept. Good leverage points are observations that are outlying in the 
space of explanatory variables but that are located close to the regression line. Their 
presence does not affect the OLS estimation, but it affects statistical inference 
because they do deflate the estimated standard errors. Finally, bad leverage points 
are observations that are both outlying in the space of explanatory variables and   15
located far from the true regression line. Their presence significantly affects the OLS 
estimation of both the intercept and the slope.” 
Using this terminology one can state that the popular median regression 
estimator (also known as Least Absolute Deviations or LAD) protects against vertical 
outliers but not against bad leverage points (Verardi and Croux 2009, p. 441). Full 
robustness can be achieved by using the so-called MM-estimator that can resist 
contamination of the data set of up to 50% of outliers (i.e., that has a breakdown 
point
16 of 50 % compared to zero percent for OLS). A discussion of the details of this 
estimator is beyond the scope of this paper (see Verardi and Croux (2009) for this 
estimator and for Stata commands to compute it). Suffice it to say here that this 
estimator combines a breakdown point of 50 percent with a high efficiency (the 
degree of which can be chosen by the researcher). An explicit formula for the 
estimator is not available; it is computed by numerical optimization. 
Results computed by the fully robust MM-estimator are reported in the second 
column of Table 5.
17 The point estimates are very similar to the results computed by 
OLS, and the estimated regression coefficient for the granular residual is again highly 
statistically significant. 
The bottom line, then, is that the good explanatory power of the granular 
residual is inconsistent with a representative firm framework. The manufacturing part 
of the German export sector is a granular economy. 
 
[Table 5 near here] 
                                                           
16 The breakdown point of an estimator is the highest fraction of outliers that an estimator can 
withstand, and it is a popular measure of robustness. 
17 Computations were done using the ado-files provided by Verardi and Croux (2009) with the 
efficiency parameter set at 0.7 as suggested there based on a simulation study; details are available 
on request.    16
5.  Concluding remarks  
This study shows that a very large share of the decline in exports from manufacturing 
firms in Germany in 2009 was due to negative changes of exports in enterprises that 
continued to export (i.e. at the so-called intensive margin) while the decrease of 
exports due to export stoppers (at the so-called extensive margin) was tiny. In West 
Germany where exports declined by 21 percent a small fraction made of five percent 
of all exporting firms from the size class with 500 or more employees was responsible 
for around 73 percent of the gross decrease in exports. Idiosyncratic movements of 
the top 10 firms in an industry can explain a large fraction (more than one third) of 
export fluctuations here. In East Germany where exports declined only moderately by 
3.77 percent a large fraction of the gross decline of exports was compensated by an 
increase in exports in a small group of large firms that made up 0.5% of all firms 
engaged in exports.   
This paper demonstrates that idiosyncratic shocks in the largest firms are 
important for an understanding of aggregate volatility in exports from German 
manufacturing industries. This finding has implications for both theoretical and 
empirical research and for economic policy. 
Theoretical models should drop the assumption of homogeneous 
representative firms and consider heterogeneous firms instead – like, for example, in 
the rich literature from the new new trade theory surveyed in Redding (2010).  
Empirical studies that investigate the role of the largest firms need to be based 
on firm level data, and an easy access to these data (that are often confidential like 
the micro data from official statistics used in this study) for researchers is a must to 
foster research that will help us to understand what drives aggregate movements of 
the economy. While it is not possible to identify the names of the largest firms from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
   17
confidential firm level data like this, fortunately the usual suspects are well known and 
published annual reports or information available in commercial data bases can be 
used to investigate the concrete shocks to large players (like Daimler, Siemens, 
Volkswagen, BASF or Bosch in German manufacturing).  
Policy makers should be aware of the decisive role of a small number of very 
large firms for the development of the economy as a whole. These firms should be 
closely monitored. In a discussion of changes in laws and policy measures, and in 
evaluations of such changes, special emphasis should be put on the impact on the 
big players. 
In sum, the by now familiar decomposition analysis and the granular approach 
recently introduced by Gabaix (2011) suggests a road that should be travelled in the 
analysis of export dynamics and a number of other topics that are highly relevant for 
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    [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]    [5]    [6]    [7] 
 
Total exports  Total exports  Rate of   Increase of    Increase of    Decrease of    Decrease of    
    in  2008   in 2009   change   exports  due   exports  due   exports  due   exports  due 
    (Million  Euro)  (Million  Euro)  of  exports  to  export     to firms with    to firms with    to export 
        ( p e r c e n t )   s t a r t e r s     i n creased exports  decreased exports  stoppers 
          (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1]) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All  enterprises    574,020 451,947 -21.27   0.05    3.14    -24.15    -0.31 




   
1 – 49 employees    9,810    8,214    -16.27   1.04    9.46    -24.84    -1.93 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (376 / 5.02)    (2,223 / 29.70)    (4,454 / 59.50)    (433 / 5.78) 
 
50 – 99 employees    21,154    17,392    -17.78   0.48    7.16    -24.74    -0.68 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (121 / 2.23)    (1,466 / 27.04)    (3,700 / 68.24)    (135 / 2.49) 
 
100  –  249  employees   54,546   44,555   -18.32   0.11    5.43    -23.64    -0.22 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (37 / 0.88)    (1,019 / 24.22)    (3,118 / 74.11)    (33 / 0.78) 
 
250 – 499 employees     64,139    51,239    -20.11   0.06    3.81    -23.46    -0.52 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (9 / 0.56)    (342 / 21.32)    (1,240 / 77.31)    (13 / 0.81) 
 
>= 500 employees    424,370  330,546  -22.11    0.001    2.40    -24.28    -0.24 











    [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]    [5]    [6]    [7] 
 
Total exports  Total exports  Rate of   Increase of    Increase of    Decrease of    Decrease of    
    in  2008   in 2009   change   exports  due   exports  due   exports  due   exports  due 
    (Million  Euro)  (Million  Euro)  of  exports  to  export     to firms with    to firms with    to export 
        ( p e r c e n t )   s t a r t e r s     i n creased exports  decreased exports  stoppers 
          (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1])   (%  on  [1]) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All  enterprises    75,392   72,548   -3.77   0.11    8.85    -12.63    -0.11 






1 – 49 employees    1,439    1,134    -21.18   2.02    8.41    -29.11    -2.50 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (125 / 8.64)    (417 / 28.84)    (773 / 53.46)    (131 / 9.06) 
 
50 – 99 employees    3,246    2,654    -18.22   0.21    8.78    -26.38    -0.83 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (37 / 3.83)    (306 / 31.64)    (574 / 59.36)    (50 / 5.17) 
 
100  –  249  employees   7,525   6,523   -13.32   0.65    8.83    -22.60    -0.20 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (21 / 2.69)    (224 / 28.72)    (520 / 66.67)    (15 / 1.92) 
 
250  –  499  employees     6,177   5,327   -13.76   ##    ##    -20.19    -0.07 
(No. of firms / share in %)              (2 / 1.03)    (51 / 26.15)    (139 / 71.28)    (3 / 1.54) 
 
>=  500  employees   57,006   56,910   -0.17   0.00    9.13    -9.30    0.00 




Note: ## indicates that the number is confidential because there are only two export starters. The increase of exports due to export starters, therefore, is about next 





Table 3:  Concentration of domestic and export sales in enterprises from German manufacturing industries, 2008 – 2009 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year      Share of largest # exporters      Share of largest # enterprises     
                               in total exports (percent)        in total domestic sales (percent)   





2008    13.64  24.98  38.07  45.09    8.84      15.20  25.91  31.10     




2008    ##.## 56.60 70.55 76.62   14.46 21.68 34.78 42.42    
2009    ##.## 62.86 74.82 80.02   16.23 23.30 36.51 43.68  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4:  Estimated power law exponents for exports in manufacturing 




Industry  ß   t-value   R
2   Number of enterprises
   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All   -0.356   -103.27   0.744   21,328 
 
15/16   -0.355   -25.18   0.775   1,268 
17   -0.330   -45.21   0.793   511 
18/19   -0.332   -12.67   0.774   321 
20   -0.248   -18.03   0.754   650 
21   -0.368   -17.12   0.754   586 
22   -0.174   -20.10   0.656   808 
23/24   -0.550   -23.62   0.811   1,116 
25   -0.347   -30.94   0.778   1,914 
26   -0.318   -19.54   0.755   764 
27   -0.477   -18.56   0.811   689 
28   -0.259   -42.28   0.728   3,575 
29   -0.382   -47.02   0.758   4,421 
30/31   -0.379   -26.89   0.756   1,446 
32   -0.460   -12.19   0.804   297 
33   -0.386   -24.00   0.764   1,152 
34   -0.490   -18.08   0.774   654 
35   -0.529   -9.62   0.799   185 
36   -0.317   -22.03   0.769   971 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: For a definition of the industries see the appendix table. The power law exponent ß and its standard error 













Table 5:  Explanatory power of the granular residual for export growth in manufacturing industries, West Germany,  
  2008/2009 
 
Independent variable: export growth 2008/2009 (percentage) 
       
     Estimation  method:  OLS    Estimation  method:  Robust  MM-Regression 
 
Granular  residual  2008/2009   ß  0.00868     0.00962     
     P   0 . 0 0 0      0 . 0 0 0  
Constant    ß  -19.515     -18.106 
     P   0 . 0 0 0      0 . 0 0 0  
N u m b e r   o f   i n d u s t r i e s      1 8      1 8  
R
2       0 . 3 5 7      n . a .  
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Appendix: Definition  of  manufacturing industries and number of enterprises  
  in  2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
N o .   I n d u s t r y            N o .   o f  
           e n t e r p r i s e s  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
15  Manufacture  of  food  products  and  beverages      3,998 
16  Manufacture  of  tobacco  products        15             
17  Manufacture  of  textiles           561 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur         251    
19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of leather goods      116    
20  Manufacture of wood and products of wood except furniture        951 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products          651    
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media        1,254 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel      44       
24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical  products      1,157 
25  Manufacture  of  rubber  and  plastic  products       2,206 
26  Manufacture  of  other  non-metallic  mineral  products      1,251 
27  Manufacture  of  basic  metals        751       
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment    5,070 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment  n.  e.  c.      5,061 
30  Manufacture of office machinery and  computers         126       
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n. e. c.        1,638 
32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipm.  and apparatus    354    
33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches, clocks    1,623 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers          762 
35  Manufacture  of  other  transport  equipment              236 
36  Manufacture  of  furniture,  manufacturing  n.  e.  c.      1,171 
           _ _ _ _ _  
                                      29,247 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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